What is the legal situation in a South Africa government of national unity where a budget is passed without majority vote?
National Budget Approval, Majority Votes, and Coalition Governments in South Africa
Constitutional Requirements for Passing the National Budget
Under South Africa’s Constitution, government spending must be authorized by an Act of Parliament. Specifically, Section 213 of the Constitution provides that money can be withdrawn from the National Revenue Fund only “in accordance with an Act of Parliament”
. In practice, this means the annual budget – presented as the Appropriation Bill and other money bills – must be passed by Parliament before funds can be spent. There is no special super-majority requirement for budget bills; like any ordinary legislation, they must obtain a simple majority of votes in the National Assembly (NA) to become law
. If the governing party or coalition does not command a majority in the NA, it must secure support from enough other Members of Parliament (MPs) to reach the 50%+1 threshold for the budget to pass
.
The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) reinforces the constitutional framework by setting timelines and contingency measures for the budget process. Section 27 of the PFMA mandates that the Finance Minister table the national budget before the start of the new financial year (which begins April 1), except in exceptional circumstances
. This aligns with the principle that the budget should be approved in time to ensure uninterrupted government operations
. If, however, the budget is delayed or not passed on schedule, the law provides interim measures: Section 29 of the PFMA permits the government to withdraw limited funds from the National Revenue Fund as a stopgap until the new budget is approved
. These interim funds are capped – for example, not more than 45% of the previous year’s appropriations in the first four months of the new fiscal year, and no more than 10% per month thereafter, with an overall limit of 100% of the prior year’s budget
. This legal safety net averts an immediate shutdown by allowing essential services to continue temporarily, but it is predicated on the expectation that Parliament will pass a new budget law in short order
.
In summary, the Constitution requires that a national budget be authorized by a parliamentary act, and by convention this requires a majority vote in the NA. Failing to secure that majority means the Appropriation Bill (and related budget bills) cannot become law. The legal framework anticipates such a scenario by enabling limited spending for a brief period, but ultimately a new budget act must be passed to fully fund government beyond the short term
.
Parliamentary Procedure for Budget Approval
The annual budget process follows a well-defined parliamentary procedure. The Finance Minister (on behalf of the executive) initiates the process by drafting the budget and delivering the Budget Speech in February, outlining proposed revenues (tax measures) and expenditures for the upcoming year
. This presentation is accompanied by the tabling of key budget bills: notably the Appropriation Bill (allocating funds to government departments), the Division of Revenue Bill (distributing funds between national, provincial, and local governments), and any tax amendment bills required to give effect to revenue proposals
. According to the PFMA, the Minister must introduce the budget bills before the new financial year begins, unless there are special circumstances justifying a delay
.
Once tabled, these bills are scrutinized by Parliament. The National Assembly has the power to debate, amend, and ultimately approve or reject the budget. (Since 2009, the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act empowers the NA to amend the budget, a departure from earlier practice where it could only accept or reject it.) The budget bills are typically referred to parliamentary committees (e.g. the finance and appropriations committees) for detailed examination and to consider amendments. Throughout this stage, input is often sought from the opposition and the public, especially in a coalition setting where consensus must be built. After committee reports, the NA holds plenary debates on the budget and must vote on each budget bill. A quorum must be present, and a simple majority of members voting is required to pass each bill
. In a government of national unity scenario (i.e. a multiparty coalition government without one party holding over 50% of seats), the outcome of this vote depends on cooperation across party lines. The ruling coalition must ensure its members (and sometimes additional opposition MPs) vote in favor, since failure to attain a majority means the bill is defeated.
It is important to note the role of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) in the budget process as well. The Division of Revenue Bill, which allocates funds to provincial and local governments, is a Section 76 bill that requires NCOP approval. If the NCOP and NA disagree on such a bill, a mediation committee can be convened to resolve differences. However, the Appropriation Bill (funding national departments) is a Section 77 money bill, which formally is considered by the NA; the NCOP may make recommendations but cannot block the Appropriation Bill – the NA’s approval is decisive. In practice, both Houses usually coordinate to pass the budget smoothly.
During a coalition government (the current so-called “Government of National Unity”), extra procedural caution is needed: the budget is often negotiated within the coalition before it even reaches Parliament
. In 2025, for example, the coalition partners failed to agree on key budget provisions ahead of time, causing the Finance Minister’s scheduled budget speech to be postponed at the last minute
. This was unprecedented and indicated that parliamentary procedures had to be paused to allow further consensus-building. Normally, however, once the budget bills come to a vote in the NA, the expectation is that the governing parties will present a united front to secure passage.
If the NA votes down the budget (i.e. the Appropriation Bill fails to get a majority), parliamentary rules treat it like the defeat of any government bill. The bill falls away, and the government would likely have to urgently reintroduce a revised budget or find an alternative mechanism (such as a stop-gap appropriation) to fund the state. The procedural timetable for budget adoption (usually aiming for final votes before the start of the fiscal year, or by April/May) could be thrown into disarray by such a defeat
. In coalition times, this possibility forces extensive behind-the-scenes negotiation before the vote. As one analysis noted, the 2025 budget was actually tabled only hours before the planned presentation due to protracted bargaining among coalition partners, underscoring how tight the procedural timeline can become when agreement is elusive
.
In short, passing the budget in Parliament requires adherence to constitutional timing and procedures, but in a divided legislature it ultimately hinges on political agreement. The NA must approve the budget by majority vote through the normal legislative process, and any failure at this final stage indicates a breakdown of the expected parliamentary procedure, triggering contingency steps.
Legal Implications of a Budget Failing to Secure Majority Approval
A failure to pass the national budget has serious legal and constitutional implications. The immediate consequence is that there is no legal authorization for the government to spend money in the new financial year, since the Appropriation Act (and related revenue laws) would not be enacted. In the absence of an approved budget, the Constitution’s rule in Section 213 prevents withdrawals from the National Revenue Fund, meaning the state cannot lawfully finance its programs beyond the current appropriations
.
Recognizing the disruptive potential of such a scenario, South African law provides a temporary financial bridge if the budget isn’t passed in time. Section 29 of the PFMA allows “expenditure before an annual budget is passed” by permitting limited fund withdrawals as direct charges against the Revenue Fund
. These provisions function like an automatic continuing appropriation: during the first four months of the financial year (e.g. April through July), up to 45% of the previous year’s budgeted amount can be utilized, and for each month thereafter up to 10% of the prior year’s amount may be spent, with a hard cap at 100% of the previous year’s total budget
. Crucially, these funds may be used only for services that were funded in the prior year’s budget (no new programs), and any spending under this PFMA provision must be deducted from the allocations once a new budget is eventually passed
. This mechanism ensures basic government functions can continue for a short period even without a new Appropriation Act
.
However, the PFMA’s interim measures are just that – temporary and limited. If the deadlock is not resolved reasonably quickly, the government could exhaust its spending authority. By around mid-year, without a new budget, the allowable 45% spending in four months would be used up, and the government would be constrained to stay within last year’s totals
. This would likely halt any new investments, stop the hiring of new staff, and potentially force cutbacks as inflation and growing needs mean last year’s budget is insufficient in real terms. Should the impasse persist to the point that even the 100% of the previous budget is reached without new appropriations, the government would legally run out of money to spend. At that stage, continuing to operate the government would violate the Constitution’s requirements, since expenditures would lack parliamentary sanction. In practical terms, salaries of public employees, social grant payments, and service delivery would come to a standstill if no solution is found.
Aside from fiscal operations, a budget’s failure to pass carries a constitutional signal: it demonstrates that the executive does not have the confidence of the majority of the NA on a matter of supply. While South African law does not automatically equate a failed budget vote with a no-confidence vote, it is widely interpreted as having the same effect in principle. In parliamentary tradition, losing a money bill is tantamount to losing the mandate to govern. As one commentary put it, “When a government fails to pass the budget, in any self-respecting democracy that symbolises the collapse of that government even without a vote of no confidence.”
. In other words, a government that cannot secure parliamentary approval for funding is effectively in a constitutional crisis. The opposition (and even partners in a coalition) would likely argue that the government has lost its legitimacy to rule, since it cannot carry out its basic function of allocating resources.
Legally, the formal remedy for such a situation would be a motion of no confidence in the President and Cabinet under Section 102 of the Constitution. Any member of the NA can introduce a no-confidence motion. If a majority of MPs vote in favor of no confidence in the President, the President and all Cabinet ministers are compelled to resign immediately
. This mechanism is the constitutional way to remove a government that cannot govern effectively (for instance, if it cannot pass a budget). Section 102(2) explicitly makes a no-confidence vote in the President a no-confidence in the entire Cabinet
, ensuring that the failure of the government’s budget can be addressed by installing a new executive rather than allowing paralysis. In a coalition context, even the threat of such a motion can exert pressure on the government to resolve a budget impasse, as no party in the coalition likely wants to risk an outright collapse of the government.
It’s worth noting that at municipal level, the law is even more direct: if a local council fails to approve its budget by the start of the municipal financial year, the provincial government is mandated to intervene, even to the point of dissolving the council if necessary
. The provincial executive can impose a temporary budget or take over administration to ensure services continue
. While this municipal intervention (under Section 139 of the Constitution) does not have an exact equivalent at the national level – there is no “higher” authority above the national government that can step in – it underscores how seriously a budget deadlock is treated in South African law. At the national sphere, the resolution must come from political processes within Parliament and, if needed, the electorate, rather than an external overseer.
In summary, the legal implications of a budget not securing majority approval are grave. The government’s spending authority becomes constrained and eventually void, breaching constitutional provisions. It creates a state of affairs where either the impasse is broken (by passing a budget or altering the government’s composition) or the machinery of government grinds to a halt – an outcome the Constitution and PFMA seek to prevent through interim measures and the availability of no-confidence procedures.
Historical Precedents and Relevant Challenges in South Africa
Historically, South Africa has never had a national budget defeated in Parliament since the establishment of the Union in 1910
. In the post-1994 democratic era, this scenario remained purely theoretical until very recently. The African National Congress (ANC) enjoyed an outright majority in the National Assembly from 1994 through 2019, meaning every budget during those years could be passed with ANC votes alone. Even during the Government of National Unity (GNU) period from 1994-1999 – when the 1993 Interim Constitution required that major parties share power in the Cabinet – the ANC held well over 60% of the seats in Parliament, so there was never a real danger of a budget failing. Budgets in that era were supported by the coalition partners (the National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party) as part of the negotiated governance, and no significant conflict over budget votes arose. There were no court cases or constitutional crises around budget approvals in the GNU of the 1990s, as the governing parties generally found consensus and the ANC’s majority ensured passage.
The notion of a budget not being passed only gained relevance after the 2024 general election, when for the first time the ruling ANC fell below a majority in the NA
. A coalition government was formed, informally dubbed a new “Government of National Unity,” comprising the ANC and other parties (most prominently the Democratic Alliance, or DA)
. This power-sharing arrangement echoed the spirit of 1994’s GNU, but with a crucial difference: it was born out of electoral necessity rather than a constitutional requirement, and the coalition’s combined votes were needed to reach a majority. In 2025, this coalition encountered an unprecedented impasse over the budget. Disagreements between the ANC and DA over a proposed VAT increase prevented the Finance Minister’s budget from obtaining coalition backing, leading to an eleventh-hour postponement of the budget speech – the first such delay in democratic South African history
. Observers noted that this “chaos around the Budget Speech was unprecedented in post-apartheid South Africa”, with no comparable precedent even “since South Africa became a Union in 1910.”
. This underscores how extraordinary the situation was: never before had a finance minister been unable to present the budget on schedule due to lack of majority support.
Although the 2025 budget delay did not result in an outright defeat on the parliamentary floor (it was proactively postponed to avoid a failed vote), it brought to light the very scenario in question. The historical record, therefore, has quickly evolved from “it never happened here” to having a live example of a coalition-driven budget crisis. In this instance, the impasse was resolved within a few weeks by reworking the budget (scaling back the VAT hike proposal) and securing coalition consensus to pass it on a second attempt
. Nonetheless, that incident has effectively set a precedent and raised the question of what would happen if such a consensus had not been reached.
At sub-national levels, there have been a few notable episodes that offer parallels or lessons. In several municipalities with hung councils or fragile coalitions, budgets have occasionally failed to pass by the legal deadline. For example, the City of Johannesburg’s council (under a multi-party coalition) experienced chaos when an adjustment budget could not be adopted due to coalition infighting, essentially stalling the budget process
. In such cases, Section 139 of the Constitution empowers the provincial government to intervene. Provinces have, in some instances, imposed temporary budgets or even dissolved municipal councils that were unable to pass budgets, to protect residents from a shutdown of services
. These interventions have been upheld as necessary and constitutional, emphasizing that failure to approve a budget is treated as a governance failure warranting urgent remedy. While the national government cannot be “dissolved” by any external authority in the same manner, these municipal precedents highlight the principle that a stalemate on a budget is intolerable in a functional democracy.
In terms of legal challenges, thus far there have been no direct court cases in South Africa contesting a national budget that failed to pass, simply because the situation had not fully materialized before. It is possible that if a national budget were voted down, interested parties might approach the courts for guidance – for instance, to clarify the extent of the executive’s spending powers under PFMA’s emergency provisions, or to confirm whether the Speaker or President is obligated to take certain actions. However, courts generally regard budget approval as a core legislative function and a political question. They would likely be reluctant to interfere unless there was a clear violation of constitutional procedure (for example, if the executive tried to spend funds with no authorization at all). The more likely “legal” resolution would happen within Parliament itself via a no-confidence vote or a negotiated compromise, rather than via litigation.
In summary, South Africa’s historical experience with budgets has until recently been smooth due to single-party dominance. The current coalition era has introduced new challenges, illustrated by the unprecedented postponement of the 2025 budget – a situation with no exact precedent in South African national history
. That near-crisis was resolved politically, so no judicial intervention was tested. But it stands as a cautionary episode that has many looking back to history (and to analogous cases in other countries) for clues, even though “one would be hard-pressed to find a precedent” in South Africa’s own past for a government failing to pass its budget
.
Political Consequences of a Budget Impasse
The failure of a national budget to obtain majority support would be as much a political crisis as a legal one. Politically, a budget vote is often treated as a measure of confidence in the government. A defeat on the budget would likely shatter the governing coalition or party’s credibility in Parliament and could trigger a chain reaction of political events. The immediate consequence is that the government’s agenda is halted – it cannot implement new programs or maintain existing ones fully – which puts enormous pressure on the Cabinet to find a solution or face resignation.
In a coalition government (like the current ANC-DA “national unity” coalition), a budget impasse exposes cracks in the alliance. It signals that the partners cannot agree on fundamental policy priorities (in 2025, the VAT increase was the flashpoint of disagreement
). Such public discord undermines the coalition’s unity and may lead to blame-trading and loss of trust among the parties. If one major coalition partner outright refuses to support the budget, the coalition effectively loses its majority, and the government stands on shaky ground
. For instance, analysts noted that with the ANC holding about 40% of NA seats and its allies holding roughly 10% more, without the DA’s votes the coalition had only 200 seats – exactly half of the Assembly, not enough to pass a budget
. In that scenario, the ruling ANC would have limited options: either persuade the DA (or dissenting partner) to relent, or seek support from opposition benches to reach the 201 votes needed
. Both choices carry political costs – either policy concessions within the coalition or striking deals with rival parties – and failure to do either would mean the government cannot govern effectively.
The broader political consequence is the potential collapse of the government. While not automatic, a failed budget often precipitates a vote of no confidence (or at least intense calls for one) as mentioned earlier. Political norms suggest that a government that cannot secure supply should step down. Opposition parties would almost certainly seize on a budget failure to argue that the administration has lost its mandate. Even within the ruling coalition, members might pressure the President to reshuffle the Cabinet or even resign to preserve stability. As an illustrative sentiment reflecting this norm, an opposition leader in Lesotho (a fellow parliamentary democracy) declared that if a government fails to pass its budget, it “symbolises the collapse of that government even without a vote of no confidence”
. In South Africa, we could expect similar rhetoric: the moment a budget vote is lost, the writing is on the wall that the current executive’s days are numbered unless they can pull off a drastic political maneuver to recover.
Additionally, economic and public finance repercussions feed into the political pressure. Financial markets react negatively to uncertainty around the budget. The recent postponement in 2025, for example, caused the South African rand to slide and government bond yields to rise due to investor concerns about coalition stability and fiscal direction
. A full-scale budget defeat (as opposed to a short delay) would likely have even more severe market fallout – credit rating agencies could view it as institutional dysfunction, and businesses and consumers would worry about government services and payments. Such economic signals amplify the political consequences: the public may grow alarmed at the prospect of a government shutdown or austerity measures, eroding confidence in the ruling parties. Members of Parliament, sensitive to their constituencies and the next elections, would not want to be seen as incapable of even passing a budget.
Within the coalition, a budget impasse can lead to realignment of political alliances. If the existing partnership proves unworkable, parties might explore new partnerships. For instance, in the wake of the VAT dispute, there was open speculation that the ANC might turn to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) for support if the DA remained intransigent
. Such a move would be politically dramatic (aligning with a more radical opposition party) but underscores that failing to pass a budget forces parties to consider breaking current alliances and forming new ones to cobble together a majority. On the flip side, a junior coalition partner like the DA must weigh the consequences of sticking to its position: if its refusal to compromise leads the ANC to partner with someone else (leaving the DA out of government), that could alter the political landscape significantly. Thus, the stakes are extremely high for each actor.
The collapse of a coalition over the budget could ultimately lead to one of two outcomes: either a new coalition or government is formed within the existing Parliament, or an early election is eventually called to resolve the deadlock. South Africa’s Constitution, however, makes immediate early elections difficult – the President cannot simply dissolve Parliament at will. An early dissolution of the NA is only permitted after three years of its five-year term (and even then requires a majority vote of the Assembly to do so). This means in a scenario like 2025, an election could not be called until 2027 unless a no-confidence vote passes and no alternative government can be formed. Therefore, the more likely short-term outcome of a budget failure would be a change in government without an election: either via a new President elected by the NA or a reconstituted coalition with a different agreement on policy. We saw a mini-preview of this in how the budget was renegotiated in 2025 – the major parties were essentially forced back to the table to avoid political catastrophe
. Had they not done so, the next step would have been a political showdown in Parliament, potentially unseating the government.
In summary, the political consequences of a budget not passing are government paralysis and a crisis of confidence in the leadership. It threatens the survival of the coalition or ruling party in power, invites opposition challenges, and can reconfigure the party landscape. No government can easily withstand the blow of being unable to finance itself; it would either have to drastically reform its internal agreements or face collapse. The situation is inherently unstable, which is why in parliamentary democracies a failed budget is so rare – leaders usually make the compromises necessary to avoid flying off this political cliff.
Mechanisms to Resolve a Budget Impasse
Should South Africa find itself in a national budget impasse – a budget bill that cannot get majority support – there are several mechanisms and pathways to resolve the deadlock. These range from political negotiation and compromise to formal constitutional procedures: all aimed at restoring a functional government with an approved budget.
1. Renegotiation and Compromise: The first and most immediate mechanism is for the governing coalition or party to revise the budget proposal to make it acceptable to enough lawmakers. This was the approach taken in 2025 when the initial budget proposal met resistance. The contentious VAT hike was rethought and a smaller increase (or alternative revenue measures) was considered as a compromise
. By adjusting spending and revenue plans to address the concerns of dissenting coalition partners, the government can turn a failing budget into a passable one. This often involves intense internal bargaining – for example, the ANC might agree to deeper spending cuts that the DA wants, in exchange for the DA agreeing to some moderate tax increase. Such deal-making is the classic way coalitions resolve disputes. The Institute for Economic Justice noted that the postponed 2025 budget actually “opens the door for alternatives” to be explored, indicating that civil society and opposition input might also shape a revised budget
. In short, the content of the budget can be tweaked until a majority in the NA is cobbled together.
2. Seeking Cross-Party Alliances: If compromise within the existing coalition is not possible (or if the government is a minority government), the next option is to seek votes from outside the governing alliance. This could mean forging a temporary “confidence and supply” arrangement or policy concessions to another party that isn’t formally in government. For instance, if the DA were to withhold support, the ANC might approach smaller opposition parties or the EFF to secure the needed votes for the budget
. This could entail promising those parties certain budget allocations for their constituencies or adopting some of their policy priorities in the budget. In parliamentary practice, it’s not uncommon for minority governments to survive by negotiating support on budgets in exchange for certain compromises (often formalized in a written agreement). In the South African context, this might be unfamiliar at the national level, but it is a viable solution. The ANC signaled in 2025 that if the impasse continued, it would consider reaching out to the EFF for support
. Likewise, DA leaders acknowledged that if their demands were not met, the ANC “would have to get support from parties outside of the alliance” to pass the budget
. Thus, broadening the coalition (even informally) is a mechanism to get over the 50% threshold.
3. Changing the Coalition Composition: A more drastic political solution is to reconfigure the governing coalition itself. If a key partner remains intransigent on the budget, the majority party might decide to replace that partner with a more agreeable ally. This could involve ousting one party from the coalition and bringing another in. For example, an ANC-led government could break with the DA and form a new coalition with the EFF and other smaller parties, if that alignment could secure a majority and agree on a budget. Such realignments are complex and could take time, but they are a definitive way to resolve policy stalemates – essentially forming a new government that can agree on a budget. South African politics is in flux, and scenarios once thought unlikely (like an ANC-DA alliance) have already happened
, so an ANC-EFF alliance, for instance, is conceivable if necessity dictates. The downside is that this can significantly alter policy direction and might require a reshuffle of Cabinet positions to satisfy the new partners. Still, this mechanism addresses the impasse by changing the team in charge to one that has aligned interests on fiscal matters.
4. Confidence Motions and Government Reshuffle: If political negotiations fail to produce a compromise or a new coalition, the stalemate may be resolved by a motion of no confidence and subsequent government change. As discussed, a successful no-confidence vote (Section 102(2)) would remove the President and Cabinet
. The NA would then elect a new President (likely from a different party or a reconfigured coalition) who can form a Cabinet that has majority support. This effectively “resets” the government. The new executive would then quickly put forward its own budget or reintroduce the pending budget with amendments, which presumably the new majority would pass. This route is essentially a constitutional mechanism to break an impasse by changing leadership. Notably, in 2018, a South African President (Jacob Zuma) resigned under threat of a no-confidence vote (though not over a budget issue), showing that the process can prompt leadership change. In a budget crisis scenario, one could imagine the NA saying: “Since the current government cannot govern, we will install one that can.” For example, if the ANC-DA coalition collapsed, the NA might rally behind a new coalition leader (even perhaps the DA or another figure) who could muster 50%+ support. This is an extreme measure, but it squarely resolves the question of who governs, allowing the budget process to restart under new management.
5. Last Resort – Dissolution and New Elections: The ultimate mechanism, if all else fails, is to call an early general election to let voters break the deadlock. However, as noted, the South African Constitution restricts when Parliament can be dissolved. Before the midpoint of the NA’s five-year term, the only path to an election is if no new government can be formed after a no-confidence event. In practice, if a budget impasse led to a no-confidence vote and the President’s removal, and if the NA then found itself unable to elect any replacement President (no coalition or candidate can get a majority), the situation would be untenable. Although the Constitution doesn’t explicitly state a timeframe in this scenario, convention from other parliamentary systems suggests that persistent failure to form a government would necessitate dissolution. The acting President (likely the Speaker or an interim appointee) could be forced to proclaim an election if the Assembly is hung. More directly, after three years into the term, the NA can vote by simple majority to dissolve itself (Section 50), which would trigger new elections. Politically, the threat of elections can motivate parties to compromise (since many MPs prefer to avoid an early end to their tenure). But if governance truly breaks down, returning to the electorate for a fresh mandate is the final constitutional solution.
6. Public and Institutional Pressure: Though not a formal “mechanism,” it’s worth mentioning that broad pressure from civil society, business groups, and even the President’s own party structures can push leaders to resolve a budget stalemate. In 2025, voices from labor unions and business forums loudly criticized the idea of a protracted impasse, warning of economic harm
. This kind of public pressure can act as a mechanism by influencing the calculus of political actors. No government wants to be seen as failing to do its most basic job, so mounting public dissatisfaction can compel previously obstinate parties to reach an agreement.
In conclusion, while a national budget impasse in South Africa would be a serious crisis, there are multiple avenues to resolve it. The likely sequence would start with negotiation and compromise to adjust the budget enough to satisfy a majority
. If that failed, the focus would shift to shifting alliances or bringing in new support to get the votes
. Failing that, the issue would move from the budget itself to the question of who governs – handled through confidence votes and possibly installing a new government that can pass a budget
. Only if all these efforts are exhausted would a new election come into play as the ultimate reset button. South Africa’s recent experience shows that even coming close to an impasse is destabilizing, so all actors have strong incentives to use these mechanisms to find a resolution before the clock (and money) runs out.
Sources:
- Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 – Section 213 (National Revenue Fund) and Section 102 (No confidence motions).
- Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 – Sections 27 and 29 (budget timetable and interim spending measures)
.
- Reuters – “South African budget delay over VAT hike shows cracks in coalition” (19 Feb 2025)
.
- Bloomberg via BusinessTech – “South Africa gets ready for the plunge” (12 Mar 2025), on coalition budget negotiations
.
- Marius Roodt, BizNews/IRR: “Budget chaos: Crisis or opportunity?” (7 Mar 2025) – on the unprecedented nature of the 2025 budget impasse and coalition dynamics
.
- Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr legal alert – “Kicking for touch – postponement of the budget speech” (19 Feb 2025), outlining legal framework and implications of budget delays
.
- Lesotho Times – remark by opposition leader on budgets and confidence
(illustrating common parliamentary principle).
- News24/City Press reports on municipal budget failures and provincial interventions (e.g. Johannesburg council budget chaos)
.